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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





   v.
JEFFREY BEARD; WILLIAM STICKMAN; STANLEY FALOR;
DAN DAVIS; SHARON DELETTO; BRIAN HYDE; MICHAEL MOE;
AMERICAN SERVICE GROUP; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC.;
BRUCE TEAL; JEAN BYASSEE; CARL KELDIE; MICHAEL
CATALANO; GERALD BOYLE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-1709)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
OCTOBER 2, 2006
Before:           MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD,   Circuit Judges.





2Charles Iseley appeals from the District Court’s orders granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
In 1983, Charles Iseley was convicted of numerous robbery and assault charges. 
He is currently incarcerated at State Correctional Institution at Fayette.  Iseley suffers
from numerous physical ailments.  In 1998, he was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C (“HCV”). 
He also suffers from chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and rheumatoid arthritis.  In
2000, Iseley filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia, that the failure of the
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to offer him treatment for HCV constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.  In 2001, after the DOC changed its policy on HCV treatment, Iseley
moved for a preliminary injunction to force the DOC to provide him with prescription
drug treatment for HCV despite the fact that Iseley would not consent to psychological
testing and limited disclosure as required by the DOC’s treatment protocols.  The District
Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and we affirmed.  See Iseley v.
Dragovich, No. 03-2254, slip op. at 9 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2004)(nonprecedential opinion).
In 2002, while incarcerated at State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-
Greene”), Iseley again attempted to get treatment for his HCV.  He requested pegylated
interferon, a drug for the treatment of HCV, but was refused.  Prison officials informed
him that interferon, a different HCV drug, was the only treatment that would be available
to him.  Again, he refused to consent to psychological counseling and disclosure of his
     1Jefferey Beard, Secretary of DOC; William Stickman, Warden of SCI-Greene, and
Grievance Coordinators Sharon Deletto and Dan Davis; and Brian Hyde, Healthcare
Administrator at SCI-Greene (“Commonwealth Defendants”).
     2Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”), American Service Group, Inc. (“ASG”), PHS’s
parent company, Bruce Teal, Chief Operating Officer of PHS, Jean Byassee, Chief Legal
Counsel of PHS, Michael Catalano, Chief Executive Officer of ASG, Gerald Boyle, 
Chief Executive Officer of PHS, Carl Keldie, Chief Medical Officer of ASG, Stanley
Falor, Medical Director at SCI-Greene and Iseley’s treating physician, and Michael Moe,
an unnamed psychiatrist at SCI-Greene (“Medical Defendants”).  
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medical records as required for treatment with interferon, and he was denied treatment. 
Medical personnel also informed counselors, prison guards and other prisoners that Iseley
suffered from HCV.  
Iseley also requested treatment for his other health problems.  He requested
treatment for his chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and rheumatoid arthritis, but
never received any medical attention for those conditions.  During this time, Iseley also
informed medical personnel that he was allergic to the soap distributed to the inmates at
SCI-Greene.  Medical personnel gave him permission to purchase one bar of a different
brand of soap every two weeks. 
In October 2002, Iseley filed this pro se civil rights action in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  He brings this action against
Pennsylvania state officers and employees1 as well as the medical provider at SCI-Greene
and its employees and officers.2  His complaint listed numerous claims: that the failure of
the prison authorities and doctors to treat his HCV, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue
syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
4of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; that the medical defendants’ release of
information regarding his HCV status violated his right to privacy; that he was denied
medical treatment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); that the
refusal to treat his HCV was retaliation for his failure to consent to psychological
treatment and disclosure of his medical information; and various state law claims. 
The Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment arguing that the DOC policy regarding HCV treatment did not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment and that none of them was personally involved in the other
alleged actions.  In January 2004, the District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
report and recommendation, granted the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.  The Medical Defendants filed a separate motion for summary
judgment arguing that Iseley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  In March
2005, the District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,
granted the Medical Defendants’ motion and also dismissed the remaining state law
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review
over an order granting summary judgment.  See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329
(3d Cir. 1995).  As is well understood, summary judgment is granted when “no genuine
issue [exists] as to any material fact and [when] the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).  We will view the facts in the light most
5favorable to the nonmoving party and we will draw all inferences in that party’s favor.
See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1997).  We may affirm on
grounds other than those relied on by the District Court. See Narin v. Lower Merion
School District, 206 F.3d 323, 333 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000).
Medical Defendants
A prisoner is barred from bringing an action under § 1983 or any other federal law
“until such administrative remedies as are available have been exhausted.”  42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a).  The administrative remedies available to Pennsylvania prisoners are
described in DC-ADM 804, and involve a three-step grievance process.  First, a
prisoner’s grievance is submitted to the facility’s grievance coordinator, DC-ADM 804
Part VI.B.  If the problem is not resolved at the level of the grievance coordinator, then
the decision may be appealed to the Facility Manager, DC-ADM 804 Part VI.C.  Finally,
an aggrieved prisoner may appeal this decision to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals, DC-ADM 804 Part VI.D.  Only after a prisoner has gone
through all of these steps has he exhausted his available administrative remedies.  Spruill
v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004).  
According to the undisputed affidavit of Dan Davis, the grievance coordinator at
SCI-Greene, Iseley did not comply with these requirements.  (See Appellant’s Br. App.
17.)  Iseley filed grievances regarding his failure to receive treatment for his medical
ailments and his soap allergy.  He appealed those grievances to the SCI-Greene’s
Superintendent, but did not file any subsequent appeals to the Secretary’s Office of
6Inmate Grievances and Appeals.  Thus, he did not exhaust administrative remedies, and
his suit against the Medical Defendants cannot proceed further.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 203
F.3d 65, 78 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Iseley does not dispute that he failed to appeal any of his grievances to the 
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals.  However, he claims that the Davis
affidavit shows that there were no administrative remedies available to him, and thus, he
had fulfilled § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement.  Although the Davis affidavit describes
the grievance procedure described in DC-ADM 804, on two occasions there is a mistaken
reference to DC-ADM 801, the grievance procedure for inmates facing discipline.  Iseley
claims that, since he was not facing discipline, the procedures of DC-ADM 801 were not
available to him and the Davis affidavit’s conclusion that “Mr. Iseley did not exhaust his
administrative remedies pursuant to DC-ADM-801 [sic]” does not bar his suit.  However,
this argument is based on a misreading of Davis’ Affidavit.  It is clear from the rest of
Davis’ affidavit, where he names and describes the procedures under DC-ADM 804 in the
context of Iseley’s grievances, that the references to DC-ADM 801 are  typographical
errors and that Davis is describing Iseley’s use of the procedure available under DC-
ADM 804.  According to the undisputed evidence in the record, Iseley failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies and his suit against the Medical Defendants is
barred.
     3The Commonwealth Defendants waived the affirmative defense that Iseley failed to
exhaust administrative remedies because they did not raise it, in the District Court or here,
and we will address Iseley’s claims against them on the merits.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c);
Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Commonwealth Defendants3
In order for a denial of medical care to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation, it must constitute “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs” of a prisoner.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976).  To prove deliberate indifference, plaintiff must establish that prison officials
were aware that the plaintiff faced a “substantial risk of serious harm,” but disregarded
“that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 847 (1994).  This test provides considerable latitude to prison medical authorities,
and courts will defer to their sound medical judgment.  Inmates of Allegheny County Jail
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).  Mere negligence or inadvertence is
insufficient to show an Eighth Amendment violation.  Id. 
Iseley’s claim that he was denied treatment for HCV is, based on his own
admissions, not true.  Rather, he refused interferon treatment because he would not
consent to the release of his medical records and concomitant psychological treatment as
required by DOC policy.  Iseley claims that psychological treatment was not necessary
for interferon treatment and that prison authorities’ insistence that he submit to counseling
forces him to either suffer  the imposition of unwanted treatment, or be denied treatment
     4This argument is identical to Iseley’s claim that he was retaliated against for refusing
mental health care.  (Comp. ¶ 81.)
     5The Commonwealth Appellees argue on appeal that these claims should be barred by
collateral estoppel.  However, because the Commonwealth never raised the affirmative
defense of collateral estoppel below, the argument is waived.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); 47
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 637 (2006) (“The failure to plead or raise in a timely manner
matters calling for the application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
generally is regarded as a waiver.”)
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for a serious medical condition.4  He has raised this argument before, see Dragovich, No.
03-2254, slip. op. at 4 n.3, and we found it unpersuasive.  It is still unpersuasive.5 The
DOC’s requirement that prisoners undergoing interferon treatment submit to
psychological evaluation and treatment is a reasonable inclusion in the HCV drug
treatment protocol.  According to Iseley’s own materials, side effects of interferon include
severe depression and suicidal thoughts.  (See e.g. Objections to Magistrate Report and
Recommendation, Appellant’s Br. App. 11 Ex. 10.)  Because of these side effects, the
DOC protocols for HCV treatment exclude those suffering depression, psychosis, bipolar
disorder from interferon treatment.  (Appellant’s Br. App. 16.)  The inclusion of
psychological evaluation and counseling in the DOC’s treatment protocol is an exercise
of sound medical judgment; not, as Iseley contends, an instance where necessary medical
treatment has been delayed or denied for a non-medical reason.  See Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).  Iseley has a
different opinion about the matter and has refused to participate in treatment, but the
Commonwealth Defendants cannot be held responsible for his unwillingness to comply
9with a legitimate treatment protocol. 
Summary judgment was also appropriate on Iseley’s other Eighth Amendment
claims.  Unlike the DOC policy involved in his denial of HCV treatment claim, Iseley
does not allege that any of the Commonwealth Defendants were involved in the denial of
treatment for his fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, and soap
allergy.  He argues that they are nonetheless liable because they were aware of these
conditions and did not act to secure him proper treatment.  However, the Commonwealth
Defendants are not medical professionals and cannot “be considered deliberately
indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a
prisoner who was already being treated by a prison doctor.”  See Durmer v. O’Carroll,
991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993); Spruill, 318 F.3d at 236 (“If a prisoner is under the care of
medical experts . . .  a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing
that the prisoner is in capable hands.”) 
Iseley’s argument that the denial of treatment for his ailments violated the ADA
fails as well.  The ADA prohibits the exclusion of otherwise qualified participants from
any program or benefits on account of their disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  A claim under
the ADA requires that: 1) the plaintiff has a disability; 2) the plaintiff is otherwise
qualified for the program sought or would be qualified if the defendant made reasonable
modifications to the program, and 3) the plaintiff was excluded from the program solely
by reason of his or her disability.  See Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d
1002, 1009 (3d Cir.1995).  Iseley does not claim that he was excluded from any program
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on the basis of his disability.  Rather he claims that he was denied medical treatment for
his disabilities, which is not encompassed by the ADA’s prohibitions.  See Bryant v.
Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the [ADA] would not be
violated by a prison's simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled
prisoners . . . [t]he ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”) 
Because there was no genuine issue of material fact and the Defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the District Court was correct in granting
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
